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Abstract 
 
This study was the outcome of recent actions taken by the Board of Building Regulation and 
Standards (BBRS).  In November 2013, the BBRS directed its Department of Public Safety 
(DPS) Staff to determine if fire protection, specifically sprinkler requirements, were being 
installed in existing multi-unit residential building renovations at the same ‘rate’ since 2010 
compared to 2009 and earlier.  The results of the study, which were reviewed in December 2013, 
showed that sprinkler installations were installed at a high rate since 2010, which was the 
inception of the current edition of the building code.  However, the study revealed additional 
issues including inconsistent code requirements and enforcement, variation in cost of 
construction, and a wide disparity in construction activity across the seven municipalities that 
contributed to the study. Consequently, in January 2014, the BBRS directed DPS to address 
these issues in a White Paper (paper). Key findings from this paper include:    
1. trends in home values versus income which show that home prices are more quickly 
outpacing the ability (income) of typical wage earners to purchase them;  
2. cost of fire protection systems. For 3 unit residential buildings the cost of a sprinkler 
system is $7,000 per unit and a fire alarm system is $2150 per unit. Both systems and a 
monitoring system at additional cost are currently required by the building code;  
3. mortality associated with unintentional fatalities during transport and non transport 
human activity in the USA in 2010. In the non transport group, accidental exposure to 
smoke, fire and flames account for 2% of the total while motor vehicle accidents, falls, 
and accidental poisoning and exposure to noxious substances lead with 29%, 27%, and 
22% respectively. In addition, mortality due to building occupancy is assessed; 
4. leading causes of fire in 2009-2011 residential fire fatalities and causes of known fires in 
multi-unit residential buildings. Fatalities are the result of Other Unintentional, Careless 
(16%), smoking (15%), electrical (11.2%), and intentional (9.4%) and the cause of most 
known fires in multi-unit residential buildings is cooking (70%); 
and provides:  
5. a recommendation for Department of Public Safety (DPS) staff to conduct state-wide 
training on Chapter 34 (Existing Buildings) to regulators and the regulated community to 
enhance consistency in the application and enforcement of this chapter of the MA state 
building code. 
6. a recommendation for DPS staff to create a code change proposal for R-2 Residential 
buildings of 3 to 6 units which incorporate the conclusions of this paper along with 
conclusions for a similar paper on the Energy Conservation requirements of the building 
code.  
 
Section 1: Introduction 
The Massachusetts Board of Building Regulations and Standards (BBRS) is a Massachusetts 
Board of eleven members M.G.L. c. 143, §93 , nine of whom are appointed by the Governor. 
The BBRS is also authorized by M.G.L. c. 143 §94 (h) to formulate and periodically update the 
state building code, which has been in effect since 1975. Additionally, the BBRS has a statutory 
duty pursuant to  M.G.L. c. 143, §94 (c) “[to] make a continuing study of the operation of the 
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state building code, and other laws relating to the construction of buildings to ascertain their 
effect upon the cost of building construction and the effectiveness of their provisions for health, 
safety, energy conservation and security.” 1   No Massachusetts board with oversight of 
construction including the plumbing code, the electrical code, the sheet metal code, or the fire 
code, has the same duty.   
 
The price of homes in MA and the USA is a function of many market variables including the 
health of the national, state, and local economies, which influence supply of and demand on the 
housing stock.  However, irrespective of other variables one thing is certain; the type and quality 
of building construction for new or existing residential units can be directly tied to the purchase 
price of a home. For example, two new homes, constructed by the same builder on identical and 
adjacent parcels of land; one built to the 4th edition of the code and the other built to the 8th 
edition of the code will not be priced equally, because more code regulation almost invariably 
leads to higher construction costs.   
 
Although the public has an opportunity via M.G.L. c. 30A, §20  to provide comment to the 
BBRS, the citizens of the Commonwealth are not really ‘at the table’ with the BBRS. Instead, 
building officials, fire officials, builders, code consultants, and others associated with the 
building industry are the usual participants; each advocating for a special interest. Without actual 
widespread public comment the BBRS should protect the interests of the consumer and maintain 
an independent and reasonable approach when reviewing and promulgating building code 
requirements.   
   
The purpose of this paper is to assist the BBRS in meeting its statutory obligation to continually 
review the cost of construction and to assure that for all building code requirements there is 
commensurate life safety benefit. Onerous and costly code requirements too often have a 
negative ripple effect, for example; the owner will meet the requirement and increase unit rent or 
sale price to offset the construction costs; the owner will take units out of service2 which further 
exacerbates an already tight housing market; or the owner will do cosmetic touch up and avoid 
high cost items that the code may require. Thus, if the life safety benefit does not justify the cost 
then it is the responsibility of the BBRS to explore alternatives such as reducing or eliminating 
the requirement.   
 
Section 2: Background 
This section contains a timeline1 of various editions of the Massachusetts State Building Code 
(780 CMR or the ‘code’) and a general description of the scope of requirements and on what 
national or local standard(s) it was based on.  
 
1st and 2nd Editions 1/1/1975. 
3rd Edition  6/1/1979. 
4th Edition  9/1/1980. 
5th Edition  3/1/1991. 
6th Edition  2/28/1997 (Commercial) and 1998 (One- and Two-Family) 
7th Edition   9/1/2008 (Commercial) and 1/1/2008 (Residential)  
8th Edition   8/6/2010 (Commercial) and 2/4/2011 (Residential)  
 
The early editions of the code were influenced by the Boston Building Code, while later editions 
were based on commercial codes issued by Building Officials and Code Administrators 
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International, Inc. (BOCA), and the one and two family codes issued by The Council of 
American Building Officials (CABO).  The 7th and 8th editions were based on the International 
Code Council (ICC). The ICC codes are in use to some extent by many states.  
   
The 1st through 6th Editions were unique MA documents that utilized the BOCA Code 
requirements for commercial buildings and the CABO Code for one- and two-family dwellings. 
Both the BOCA and CABO codes were modified to incorporate unique MA requirements. 
 
The 7th Edition utilized the ICC’s International Building Code 2003 and the International 
Residential Code 2003 and incorporated a significant quantity of unique MA requirements into 
these documents.  
 
The 8th Edition utilized the ICC’s International Building Code 2009 and the International 
Residential Code 2009, but placed the unique MA requirements in a separate document.  In this 
manner it was much easier to see the sheer number of additional requirements that building 
owners and developers in the Commonwealth need to deal with. All of the New England states 
use some version of the ICC codes, and none has as many requirements as MA.  Two points of 
this edition change should be highlighted:  1) the BBRS directed its technical advisory 
committees to make the 8th edition ‘with equivalent life safety’ to the 7th edition, in essence 
meaning that a building constructed to either edition would have similar code requirements; and 
2) the technical advisory committees were not explicitly directed to consider the cost of 
construction in this effort.  However, in 2011 the BBRS directed its advisory committees to 
review unique MA requirements which add to cost of construction relative to the requirement as 
found in the International Building Code 2009 (IBC). As a result of this effort2 many MA 
requirements were removed from the code. 
   
Over the past several decades the code has undergone regulatory expansion3 including, but not 
limited to: 
• Energy conservation due to national initiatives on climate change and energy dependence 
on foreign supplies of oil, etc. For residential buildings this has resulted in requirements 
for air tight buildings and the need to hire experts to verify building performance via 
blower door and duct leakage testing. Recently mandatory mechanical ventilation is 
required. In addition the Commonwealth was the first state in the nation to develop and 
utilize a Stretch Energy Code (Appendix 115AA)  which in turn heavily influenced the 
development of the International Energy Conservation Code 2012 to the point where 
blower door testing is now a standard requirement in many states across the nation.  
• Building design and construction since 1992 when Hurricane Andrew devastated parts of 
Florida. Consequently, the Home Insurance Industry became heavily involved in the 
national code-writing process, and since 1992 the residential code has been impacted by 
requirements for ‘hurricane fastening of framing’ and ‘wind-borne debris’ of doors and 
windows.  
• Fire protection has always been an area where the Commonwealth has invoked more 
requirements4 than any other New England state. In addition, the 6th Edition of the code 
was likely the most stringent new construction commercial state building code in the 
nation as it significantly “upped the ante” and required fire sprinklers in most new 
commercial buildings. This was a move away from a traditional construction method 
which allowed an architect or engineer to separate different ‘uses’ in the same building 
with fire rated walls and ceilings. The code required many residential and commercial 
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buildings to be sprinklered in 1997; ahead of any national code at that time. As the 
national codes evolved since then it is apparent that sprinkler advocates have had 
significant influence; the ICC codes also now require sprinklers for most uses 
(educational, mercantile, residential, etc.). However, key differences between the 
Commonwealth requirements and ICC codes and even neighboring New England states 
exist. As just one example a building constructed for a ‘business’ use in the 
Commonwealth requires sprinklers via M.G.L c. 148 §26G when its area is just 7500 sq 
ft as opposed to 12,000 sq ft elsewhere in New England and in most other states across 
the nation. 
In summary, the BBRS has reviewed the costs of construction as the code and laws evolved from 
1975 to present.  The purpose of this paper is to ensure that the BBRS continues to comply with 
its statutory obligation to review the cost of construction in response to the concerns raised with 
respect to fire protection of new and existing R-2 residential buildings. The background herein 
provides historical context that will be considered in the conclusions and recommendations that 
follow in Section 8.    
 
Section 3: Home value vs. Income 
This section examines national and local data1 on home value and income, not including data on 
rental housing and income. Because the construction costs of residential buildings can be directly 
tied to ‘price,’ it is important to provide background on home affordability with regard to 
purchase and ownership. In the USA individuals and families, have in general been afforded a 
choice to either buy or rent a home. The data and trends shown in the next sections indicate that 
fewer people in the USA including MA residents are capable of purchasing a home, which is 
why the BBRS should maintain a focus on the cost of construction and, when necessary, amend 
the code if appropriate.   
Section 3a: USA Data 
The US Census at 10-year intervals publishes income2 and home value3 data. Figure 3a shows 
the ratio of median home value to median household income data from the US Census at 10-year 
intervals. The trend in the USA from 1970 to 2000 indicates that home values are outpacing 
household income. Another perspective using the same data is that median US home values 
increased 85% (65K$ to 120K$) from 1970 to 2000 while median US household income 
increased 21% (43K$ to 52K$) in the same time period. 
 
Figure 3a 
Section 3b: MA Data 
The national trend indicates the gap between home value and income is increasing. However, 
since the BBRS is focused on the MA State Building Code it is more pertinent for this paper to 
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examine home price and income data in the Commonwealth. For this two sources of data were 
studied; median sale price of residential units and median household income in MA. The sale 
price data are from the Greater Boston Association of REALTORS4 (GBAR) and the income 
data are from American Community Survey5 by the US Census Bureau.  Figure 3b(1) shows 
median sale price of single-family homes and condominiums in MA from 2005 to 2012 and 
Figure 3b(2) shows median household income for 2005 to 2012. The ratio of sale price to 
household income is shown in the Figure 3b(3). Although the trend of the ratio is relatively flat 
through the years 2005 to 2012, it should be noted that the value of the price to income ratio is 
nearly double the USA ratio. In other words, in the year 2000 the US median home value is 
about double the household income, while in the year 2012 the MA median home price is more 
than four times the household income.  
 
 
Figure 3b(1) 
 
Figure 3b(2) 
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Figure 3b(3) 
Section 3c: Affordability 
The trends and comparisons of income and home value data appear to reveal an erosion of the 
ability of a household to purchase a home. Another perspective can be found by examining the 
method by which lenders qualify potential buyers for a home mortgage loan. There are various 
tools6 available to do this. However, assumptions should be made to simplify but not skew the 
results. For this analysis various down payment values are used; no preexisting debt is assumed; 
property tax of 1% of the purchase price is used; insurance of .5% is used; and a 30-year 
mortgage at 4.64% APR is assumed.  Figure 3c(1) shows the gross income required to qualify for 
a mortgage loan for a home at a particular price. For example, a household with an income equal 
to the 2012 MA median value of $65,300 and a down payment of $20,000 can qualify for a 
mortgage for a home priced at $240,000, which is $40,000 below the median condominium price 
in MA in 2012. This example may not even represent a realistic case because households may 
have existing debt or not hold a down payment of $20,000 or $40,000. And this example uses 
median household income7; the situation becomes worse for individual wage earners.  
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This review shows that ‘affordability’ of home ownership in MA may be much different in 2012 
than it has been historically. US Census data on home ownership rates8 is presented in Figure 
3c(2), which shows the percentage of homes that are owned by the occupants in the USA and in 
New England. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont had and continue to have higher rates than 
the USA and the other New England states. All of New England and the USA are trending to a 
slower increase in ownership rates since the 1960-1970 timeframe but Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island significantly lag the leaders by 10% and Massachusetts lags Connecticut (a similar 
southern New England state) by 5%.  To convert these percentages to potential persons affected 
by this lag the total population (2010 US Census) of the Commonwealth is 6.5 million.  
 
  
Figure 3c(2) 
Numerous studies indicate that there is a shortage of residential housing in the Commonwealth, 
and other studies9,10 indicate that the shortage will be deeper in greater metropolitan Boston in 
future years, creating unfavorable impacts to the city and state.  In addition, impediments to 
housing development including Title V, zoning, and duplicative and conflicting building 
requirements are illustrated in the Executive Office of Administration and Finance Policy Report 
Bring Down the Barriers: Changing Housing Supply Dynamics. Although this report was   
published in 2000 it is still relevant in 2014.  The recommendations contained in Section 8 are 
designed to assist in the development of safe and lower cost of construction residential units, 
which will facilitate the Commonwealth’s effort to meet the growing demand on housing stock.    
 
Section 4: Fire Protection System Operation and Costs for 
Residential Buildings  
Section 4a: Sprinkler System Operation 
The operation1 of a water-based sprinkler system is relatively simple: a fire creates heat, when 
the heat generated by the fire reaches a certain temperature (typically 135 to 165oF) at a sprinkler 
‘head’, the filament2, which holds back a valve in the head, disintegrates. The valve then opens 
and spreads water over the flame, which attenuates, but not necessarily extinguishes, the fire.   
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There are three basic designs for sprinkler systems. The code specifies which design must be 
used and when. The design requirements are found in three different National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) standards;  
1. NFPA 13D ‘Installation of Sprinkler Systems in One- and Two-family Dwellings and 
Manufactured Homes’ 
2. NFPA 13R ‘Installation of Sprinkler Systems in Residential Occupancies Up to and 
Including Four Stories in Height’ 
3. NFPA 13 ‘Installation of Sprinkler Systems’ 
 
The NFPA 13D and 13R systems are allowed only in residential buildings, and a 13D system is 
typically used in one- and two- family dwellings. A NFPA 13 system is required in many 
commercial buildings and larger residential buildings.  The NFPA 13 system is designed to be 
both a life safety and property protection system. The NFPA 13D and 13R designs are life safety 
systems only.  
Section 4a(1): Costs for One- and Two-Family Dwellings   
Although the focus of this paper is on multi-unit residential buildings, the costs for the 
installation of sprinkler systems in one- and two-family dwellings included herein is done to 
illustrate that there are multiple items and issues involved in the cost of this type of fire 
protection system.  
 
These costs are taken from pages 7 and 83 of the 2009 Report of the One and Two Family 
Residential Sprinkler Committee  (OTFRSC). This report was developed by a diverse committee 
of fire officials, building officials, fire sprinkler professionals, a BBRS member, BBRS Staff, 
and others, and was approved by the BBRS at its October 12, 2010 meeting4.  
 
Because of the limited amount of data available for sprinkler systems in one- and two-family 
dwellings there is a wide range in the installation costs found in the report. With a limited data 
set it is not reasonable to determine a statistical average of these costs. From the report the 
‘price’ that the consumer would pay for a NFPA 13D sprinkler system in a home with 2,200 sq ft 
of living space and an unfinished basement, is in the range of $4950 to $13,266. Also, the low 
end value is considered a best case scenario because maintenance costs are not considered, and 
the installation price could be driven higher by: 
• Municipal water purveyors that may require a separate water line be run to the home 
• Inability of homeowners to shut down and drain systems in vacation homes without fire 
department oversight per M.G.L. c. 148, §27A  
• The competing tradepersons like plumbers and sprinkler fitters involved with the 
installation of these systems and the preclusion of homeowners from installing them 
unlike other states, like NH and RI for example.  
Section 4a(2): Costs for Multi-Unit Residential Buildings    
The cost of a sprinkler system per dwelling unit in a multi-unit residential building may be lower 
than the cost of the ‘single’ unit of a one-family dwelling. For a three unit building the sprinkler 
cost per unit is about $5,000 for piping and heads with an additional cost of $4,000 to $12,000 
for the water supply system in the building. The low end is for a water reservoir and pump in the 
basement of the building for a NFPA 13D system while the high end is for a new line from the 
municipal water supply in the street.  
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Three actual examples are listed here: a 6-unit existing building in Western MA was retrofitted 
with a NFPA 13R system at a cost of $29,000 with an additional $10,000 for an enlarged 
municipal water supply line. And the cost for 13R systems in a city north of Boston were; 
$35,000 for a 7-unit project and $25,000 for a 3-unit project.  
Section 4b: Smoke Detection/Fire Alarm System Operation 
Fire alarm systems capable of processing alarm, trouble, and supervisory signals are provided to 
protect the ‘common’ areas of multi-unit residential buildings. Smoke detectors and water flow 
switches in the sprinkler system are the primary devices which initiate an alarm to alert 
occupants of a fire condition. Also each dwelling unit is usually provided with single/multiple 
station smoke alarms that when activated will only sound in the dwelling unit.  Currently the 
code (Sections 903 and 907) requires a fire alarm and sprinkler system in addition to a system 
which monitors the status of both. Here are examples of three operational modes: 
1. If a smoke detector in a unit is activated it will activate alarms within the unit to notify its 
occupants. It will not activate alarms elsewhere in the building to notify occupants in 
other units. This is the burnt toast scenario.  
2. If there is fire in a unit and a sprinkler head flows water then all alarms in the building are 
activated. 
3. If any common area, hall, or stairway smoke detector is activated or a sprinkler head 
flows water then all alarms in the building are activated.  
Within 90 seconds of alarm activation in modes 2 and 3 the monitoring system directly or 
indirectly notifies the fire department and a fire apparatus is dispatched to the scene.  
 
If only a fire alarm/smoke detection system is installed in a building (no sprinkler system) then 
heat detectors should be placed in each of the units. The heat detector activates on temperature 
and if it does then all alarms in the building are activated, which is similar to mode 2. described 
above.  If only a fire alarm/smoke detection system is installed then it must be monitored as well.  
 
Monitoring services are provided by a third party entity or local fire departments and provides 
two key benefits to the occupants of the building; 1. Notification to the fire department of 
potential smoke or fire at the building (without this system communication must be by someone 
at the scene via 911 or other means) 2.  Ensures that the system is operational (has power for 
example) and that all detectors are in place. Often the building owner(s) will incorporate this 
monitoring requirement by utilizing a listed combination fire/burglar detection system.  
Section 4b(1): Costs for One- and Two-Family Dwellings   
An estimated cost is $3,000 but it must be noted that this is based on limited information. To 
retain competitive advantage system providers tend to keep cost values close to the vest. It is 
expected that a sampling of actual costs from across the Commonwealth can be included here as 
this paper is disseminated.   
Section 4b(1): Costs for Multi-Unit Residential Buildings    
The estimates herein assume a  
• 3-unit residential building with 3 stories and a basement 
• 4-unit residential building with 2 stories and a basement. 
• 6-unit residential building with 3 stories and a basement. 
with the following equipment and locations: 
• 1 Smoke Detector in the basement 
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• 1 Flow Switch Module 
• 2 Tamper switch Modules 
• 1 Horn Strobe in the front and rear hallways and 1 in the basement 
• 1 Mini Horn in each dwelling unit 
• 1 Fire Alarm Control Panel 
• 1 Radio alarm communicator 
In addition installation of smoke and carbon monoxide equipment for each unit is required. It is 
assumed that each unit has two bedrooms. The overall system cost estimate is as follows:  
• 3-unit = $6,450 
• 4-unit = $6,700  
• 6-unit = $8,600 
 
Section 5: Mortality in the USA  
To understand the risk associated with day-to-day living the United States it is useful to look to 
the national bank of data on mortality. The Center of Disease Control (CDC) is the custodian of 
the mortality data, and the National Vital Statistics Report groups the data into categories based 
on internationally recognized causes of death1.  
Section 5a: Mortality Causes 
It is apparent from a cursory review of historical CDC data that the leading causes of death do 
not change much from year to year. For example heart disease and cancer have been the number 
1 and 2 causes of death for many years. This paper will review the 2,468,435 deaths in the USA 
from the National Vital Statistics Reports, Volume 61, Number 4, dated May 8, 2013 and titled 
‘Deaths: Final Data for 2010’ hereinafter known as ‘the report’. These reports are issued 
periodically by the Division of Vital Statistics (DVS).  
 
Figure 5a(1) show the fifteen leading causes of these 2+ million deaths. The report further breaks 
down these data by gender, age, and race but contained in this figure are the overall groupings. 
  
 13 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 5a(1) 
Section 5b: Accidents (Unintentional injuries) 
The 5th leading cause, Accidents (unintentional injuries), accounts for 120,859 deaths nationwide 
in 2010 which is 5% of the total. The report divides the total into two sub categories shown in 
Figure 5b(1); transport which is 31% (37, 961 deaths) and non transport 69% (82,898 deaths); 
and further again into additional sub categories as shown in Figure 5b(2).   
  
 
Figure 5b(1) 
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Figure 5b(2) 
The causes as a percentage of the total are listed below: 
29% = Motor vehicle accidents 
27% = Accidental poisoning and exposure to noxious substances 
22% = Falls 
14% = Other and unspecified nontransport accidents and their sequelae 
3% = Accidental drowning and submersion 
2% = Accidental exposure to smoke, fire and flames 
1% = Water, air and space, and other and unspecified transport 
1% = Other land transport accidents 
1% = Accidental discharge of firearms 
Section 5c: Mortality Rates and Policymaker Action  
For the purpose of this paper it is important to assess mortality risk and whether action is being 
taken to reduce it. If state or federal governments are not actively taking steps to lower a 
particular mortality rate then it will essentially remain constant.   
 
An example of this concept is motor vehicle accidents, which accounts for the largest number of 
deaths (35,332) in the Accidents (unintentional injuries) category. Motor vehicles have an 
inherent risk in their primary purpose; to move people and product quickly. Vehicle speed is an 
inherent risk which will always be present and when a collision occurs, even at a moderate 
speed, the occupants of the vehicles are at risk of sustaining injuries or fatalities. Over many 
decades vehicle features like energy-absorbing frames, lap belts, chest belts, frontal air bags and 
side air bags have been incorporated into the motor vehicle supply chain. In addition, despite the 
typical resistance to behavioral change, policy measures like mandatory seat belt use are 
common. These safety improvements have evolved as a result of active governmental 
involvement and fatalities rates have dropped2 significantly as a result of them.  
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However, in other matters of motor vehicle safety the governmental role is less clear. Every time 
an individual operates a motor vehicle he or she is more at risk of being in a fatal accident 
because there are other drivers operating while under the influence of alcohol (OUI).  Review of 
CDC data http://www.cdc.gov/injury/pdfs/cost-MV-a.pdf indicates that about one third of the 
30,000+ yearly motor vehicle fatalities are caused by alcohol-impaired operators.  Accordingly a 
single feature on all new motor vehicles could significantly reduce the cause of these accidents; a 
blood alcohol content (BAC) ignition interlock. The technology is available and is used in some 
states3 for individuals convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level over 
the legal limit. However, it is not a requirement in all new motor vehicles for many reasons 
including cost and restrictions on personal freedoms, since all operators would have their BAC 
measured.  Therefore it is not surprising to see that in the absence of firm governmental resolve 
on this issue the mortality rate of motor vehicle deaths caused by OUI has not significantly 
changed.4 
 
Although the topics covered in this section have no direct relationship to building safety there is 
relevance. First, if a particular cause of mortality cannot be eliminated then steps must be taken 
to lessen the effect of the cause. Safety features are present in motor vehicles because the very 
essence of motor vehicle use (speed) cannot be eliminated. Second, action by policymakers can 
be limited even when a known cause (for example alcohol impaired motor vehicle operation) can 
be eliminated. The conclusions and recommendations in Section 8 will use this approach as it 
pertains to building safety.   
Section 5d: Mortality due to Building Occupancy  
The previous sections contain many causes of mortality. This focus of this paper is on building 
safety and therefore a data set for a cause of mortality due to ‘building occupancy’ will be 
created. The CDC has no recognized cause of death of an individual due to occupancy of a 
building. However data can be pulled together that addresses this issue.  For example, the interior 
environment of residential buildings in some areas of the country may contain radon gas, and 
since this gas is a known carcinogen for certain exposure concentrations and durations, deaths 
caused by it will fall into a recognized international classification of diseases; namely lung 
cancer. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates the annual number of deaths due 
to radon exposure in homes to be 21,0005.  Of the total deaths by falls (26,009) about ¼ or 6,500 
occur in homes. Deaths by accidental exposure to smoke, fire and flame total 2,782 annually, and 
severe weather fatalities are about 300. Shown in Figure 5d(1) are the predominant causes of 
death related to occupancy excluding homicide, suicide, accidental poisoning, and others. 
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Figure 5d(1) 
Although these are national (USA) data and are approximations, general comparisons can be 
made to the Commonwealth. For example in the USA deaths by radon exposure exceed those by 
falls by a factor of about 3 to 1. High concentrations of radon gas is a known presence in certain 
counties in the Commonwealth, and falls are no more or less likely in the USA versus the 
Commonwealth, so in general it may be assumed that the same ratio (3 to 1) applies in MA.  
Using the same logic, in the Commonwealth falls exceed smoke or flame by 2 to 1.  These 
comparisons may aid the BBRS on where to immediately direct its primary building safety 
effort, secondary effort, and so on.   The conclusions and recommendations in Section 8 will use 
this approach as it pertains to building safety.   
 
Section 6: Fire Safety in Residential Buildings 
Section 6a: USA Data 
There are numerous and extensive studies on fire safety in residential buildings. The National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) via its staff of analysts publishes reports on fires in buildings 
across the USA. The Massachusetts Department of Fire Services (DFS), with the use of data 
from the Massachusetts Fire Incident Reporting System (MFIRS) issues annual fire reports. 
NFPA1 and DFS reports have been reviewed extensively, and general conclusions may be drawn 
which closely parallel conclusions reached by analysts in various federal government entities. To 
that end, data from reports issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will 
be examined here.  
 
The US Fire Administration arm of FEMA through in its Topical Fire Report Series2, Volume 
14, Issue 2, and dated April 2013 Civilian Fire Fatalities in Residential Buildings (2009 – 2011)  
offers a concise summary on the subject. The report indicates that annually3 from 2009 to 2011, 
an estimated 2,495 civilian fire fatalities resulted from 1,600 fatal fires in residential buildings, 
and there were also an estimated 360,900 residential building fires.  Of the total residential 
structure fires 1 in 225 results in a fatal fire. Fatal fires are those fires where one or more 
fatalities occur. Two sets of data are germane to the conclusion and recommendations which 
follow in Section 8. First is Figure 5 from this report which is copied below.  
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Of the fatal fires which have a known cause “Other unintentional, careless” actions (16%) and 
“smoking” (15%) were the leading causes or 31 percent of known causes of all residential fatal 
fires. “Other unintentional, careless” actions include misuse of materials or products, abandoned 
or discarded materials or products, and heat source too close to combustibles. The next leading 
cause, “electrical malfunction,” accounted for an additional 11 percent of residential fatal fires. 
Note that 46% of fatal fires have a cause which is “unknown”. 
 
Second is Figure 6: 
 
 
The report’s commentary on civilian activity is copied in part below: 
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“Most civilian fire fatalities occurred when the victim was attempting to escape (36 percent) or 
sleeping (35 percent). To escape a fire, many civilians make the mistake of fleeing through the 
area where the fire is located. The area of a fire has tremendous heat, smoke, and a toxic 
atmosphere that can render a person unconscious. As a result, it is imperative that an escape 
plan be prepared and practiced. With a well-thought-out plan and multiple escape options, the 
chances of survival and escaping greatly increase. In addition, it has been proven that people 
cannot wake up from the smell of fire while sleeping. Therefore, it is also vital that smoke alarms 
are installed in homes to alert sleeping people to the presence of fire.” 
 
The fatality information provided above is not separated into single family dwellings or multi-
unit residential buildings. For relevant information on the differences between one- and two-
family dwellings and multi-unit residential buildings, fire reports on these are examined.  
 
Topical Fire Report Series2, Volume 14, Issue 10, and dated September 2013 
One- and Two-family Residential Building Fires (2009-2011) cited these findings: 
• An estimated 236,200 one- and two-family residential building fires were reported to 
United States fire departments each year and caused an estimated 1,980 deaths, 
8,525injuries and 5.5 billion dollars in property loss. 
• One- and two-family residential building fires accounted for 65 percent of all 
residential building fires, representing the largest subgroup of residential building 
fires. 
• Cooking was the leading cause of one- and two-family residential building fires 
reported to the fire service (33 percent). Nearly all one- and two-family residential 
building cooking fires were small, confined fires (91 percent). 
• In 52 percent of nonconfined one- and two-family fires, the fire extended beyond the 
room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires were other unintentional, 
careless actions (17 percent); electrical malfunctions (16 percent); intentional (12 
percent); and open flame (11 percent). 
• One- and two-family residential building fire incidence was higher in the cooler 
months, peaking in January at 11 percent. 
• Smoke alarms were not present in 23 percent of the larger, nonconfined fires in 
occupied one- and two-family residential buildings. This is a high percentage when 
compared to the 3 percent of households nationally lacking smoke alarms. 
Topical Fire Report Series2, Volume 14, Issue 11, and dated September 2013 Multifamily 
Residential Building Fires (2009-2011)  cited these findings: 
• “An estimated 101,900 multifamily residential building fires were reported to United 
States fire departments each year and caused an estimated 395 deaths, 4,250 injuries 
and 1.2 billion dollars in property loss. 
• Multifamily residential building fires accounted for 28 percent of all residential 
building fires. 
• Small, confined fires accounted for 70 percent of multifamily residential building fires. 
• Cooking was the leading cause of multifamily residential building fires; nearly all 
multifamily residential building cooking fires were small, confined fires (96 percent). 
• In 31 percent of nonconfined multifamily residential building fires, the fire extended 
beyond the room of origin. The leading causes of these larger fires were exposures (13 
percent); electrical malfunctions (13 percent); intentional actions (11 percent); other 
unintentional, careless actions (11 percent); and open flames (10 percent). In contrast, 
51 percent of all other nonconfined residential building (excluding multifamily 
building) fires extended beyond the room of origin. 
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• Cooking areas and kitchens (34 percent) were the primary areas of origin for 
nonconfined multifamily residential building fires. 
• Multifamily residential building fire incidence was slightly higher in the cooler months, 
peaking in January.” 
Also copied below is a table from this report on Fire by Type of Incident which breaks down in 
more detail the confined fires. 
 
The report also points out the reasons4 why the differences between one and two family 
dwellings and multifamily residential buildings exist. Data from both of these reports indicate 
that multi-unit residential building fires in 2009-2011 are 28% (101,900 of 360,900) of the total 
fires in residential building but 16% (395 of 2495) of the total fatalities. The property loss 
comparison is also unbalanced in that multi-unit residential building fires account for 17% 
($1.2B of $7B) of the total annual property loss for residential fires in the period 2009-2011. 
Also it appears that multi-unit residential building fires cause a higher percent 33% (4,250 of 
12,775) of the total (4,250 + 8,525) injuries.  
Section 6b: MA Data 
Section 6b(1): Analysis of data from the One- and Two-Family Sprinkler 
Report. 
The One- and Two-Family Sprinkler Report contains a detailed review5 of fire fatalities in this 
type of dwelling during the period from 1986 to 2005. This report examined data pulled from the 
Massachusetts Fire Incident Reporting System (MFIRS) and surveys. The results indicate fire 
deaths are a function of many variables and among them; the age of the structure. Of the 677 fire 
deaths in this time period 20 occurred in homes built after 1975, which is when 110V hard wired 
smoke detectors were required state wide by the building code. And of these 20 deaths four of 
the victims were intimate with the fire and in 16 cases ‘there is no data on whether or not the 
smoke detectors were working’. From the report it cannot be concluded that new buildings (post 
1975) have a lower fire fatality rate (for example: number of fire deaths per 100,000 dwelling 
units) than old buildings (pre 1975). The data appear to indicate that buildings constructed post 
1975 have improved fire safety performance with respect to reduced fatalities but a detailed 
analysis should be done to either substantiate or disprove this appearance.  
Section 6b(2): MFIRS and Multi-Unit Residential Buildings 
MFIRS data6 were used to assess the fatalities in the Commonwealth due to exposure to smoke 
fire and flames in multi-unit residential buildings. Figure 6b(2) shows the cause of the 134 
fatalities in the ten-year period 2003 to 2012. This information is provided as a risk assessment 
tool for use in the development of the recommendations in Section 8 and to put into context this 
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mortality cause with other causes in the accidents (unintentional injuries) category.  For 
example, the City of Boston during the ten-year period 2002 to 2011 averaged 62.17 homicides 
per year while exposure to smoke fire and flames in its multi-unit residential buildings was 22 of 
the 134 total or 2.2 per year for the ten-year period 2003 to 2012.  
 
 
Figure 6b(2) 
In summary, USA and MA fire data and reports reviewed as part of this paper indicate that the 
ignition and heat sources of residential structure fires exist in many forms; some more prevalent 
than others. They also indicate that a building with a well designed, highly reliable, fire 
protection system will perform with reduced residential building fire fatalities and injuries. The 
conclusions and recommendations in Section 8 will address these findings.   
 
Section 7: Effectiveness1 of Fire Sprinkler Systems in MA  
Section 7a: Mortality 
Some national fire safety reports2 contain studies on the effectiveness of fire sprinkler systems, 
and the most detailed reports on the topic appear to come from the NFPA. In response to this 
white paper James Shannon from NFPA wrote the following in his letter3 to the BBRS Chair: 
‘Based on 2006-2010 structure fires reported to US municipal fire departments, when 
compared to structure fires in homes with no automatic extinguishing equipment present, 
analysis of home structure fires with wet-pipe sprinklers showed an 83% reduction in 
civilian deaths per 1,000 structure fires (from 7.3 to 1.3 deaths per 1,000 fires)…’ 
 
That is civilian deaths reduced by eighty three percent in a building with sprinklers vs. one 
without. On the face of this assertion it is possible to conclude that in a home with a single fire 
protection system, that is a wet (not dry) sprinkler system, an occupant in that building can be 
highly (83%) assured to safely exit the building in the event of a fire, and any fire regardless of 
ignition source or fire location.   
 
Although the reference to the 83% value is not cited, it is contained in a report4 issued by NFPA 
and it is a value clouded with qualifications5 including but not limited to: 
• Effectiveness does not include fires too small to activate a sprinkler head  
• Effectiveness does not include fires not located in the design fire area of the system 
37
28
21
12 11 10
7 8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Cause of Fire Fatalities in Multi-Unit 
Residential Buildings 2003 to 2012
 21 | P a g e  
 
Unfortunately small residential fires and fires not located in the design area of the system can 
produce fatalities.  
 
The Department of Fire Services in its annual Fire Problem report, analyzes data gathered across 
municipalities in MA. It includes the performance of fire sprinklers in residential buildings. It is 
not directly tied to mortality reduction and the data are qualified. Reprinted here is a section from 
the 2011 report:  
AES Present in Only 5% of Residential Building Fires  
In 2011, only 3,290 residential fires reported if the building had an automatic 
extinguishing system or not. This was only 23% of all residential building fires.  
In fires where system performance was reported, automatic extinguishing systems (AES) 
were reported present and operated effectively in 68, or 2%, of the 3,290 residential 
building fires. AES were present and operated ineffectively in four, or 0.1%, of these 
fires. In five, or 0.1%, of the fires in residential occupancies, the system did not operate. 
In 105, or 3%, the fire was too small to activate the system. In 3,108, or 90%, of the 
cases, there were no systems present or installed. AES performance was not classified in 
164, or 5%, of the incidents involving residential building fires.  
A study of this paragraph is necessary to understand the message it seeks to convey. To aid the 
reader, an interpretation is offered, summarized in these key points: 
• There were 15,000+ residential structure fires 2011. In only 3,290, the reporting authority 
noted whether or not a sprinkler system was present in the building. Of these 3,290 fires:  
o 182 were in a building with a sprinkler system and the performance of the system 
was noted. Of these 182 fires, in:  
 68 or 37%, the system operated effectively, and in 
 4 or 2% the system operated ineffectively, and in 
 5 or 3% the system did not operate, and in  
 105 or 58% the system did not operate because the fire was too small to 
activate it.  
  
Based on the information in the previous paragraphs an attempt to assign a number to mortality 
reduction effectiveness attributed solely to a sprinkler system in a residential building is no 
straightforward task. A starting point may be the 37% produced by DFS data and work up (or 
down) from there. And as stated earlier, there are some residential structure fires (like those in 
which the victim is intimate6 with the fire) that will consume a life regardless of what type of fire 
protection system is available or how quickly firefighters arrive at the scene.  Deaths from fires 
in MA multi-unit residential buildings shown in Figure 6b(2) due to cooking, arson, smoking on 
O2 and possibly smoking, may be tied to in some way to intimacy with the fire.  
 
This section also highlights a problem with all mechanical systems, including fire sprinkler 
systems7; if it is not maintained it may not perform properly. Continuous maintenance is a key to 
long standing mechanical performance. The downside to this is that attention to maintenance 
along with the associated costs is necessary.  It may be suggested that Chapter 1 of the building 
code places the responsibility and cost of maintenance squarely on the owner so the BBRS does 
not need to be concerned about this. However, the BBRS should be cognizant that MA building 
owners are required to install fire sprinkler systems in more situations versus other New England 
states and NY, as Section 2 of this paper points out.  For example, MA law or regulation may 
preclude an owner from installing a passive life safety system, like fire rated assemblies8, that 
need little care or maintenance over the life of the building. This is problematic and possibly at 
cross purposes with increasing safety because on day one of occupancy a passive system will 
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likely perform the same as it does 30 years later, but one can only say the same for a mechanical 
system if the owner does his or her due diligence and attends to mechanical maintenance. 
 
This section along with section 5c Mortality Rates and Policymaker Action will be used to 
formulate the code proposal outlined in Recommendation 2 of this paper.  
   
Section 7b: Property Loss (reserved} 
 
Section 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The conclusions reached herein are based on a review of data from federal government sources 
including FEMA, US Census Bureau, and the CDC.  If local conditions in the Commonwealth 
were required to reach conclusions then local data were used; this includes for example the topic 
of Home Value versus Income in Section 3. Although national trends in home value and income 
are useful it is more relevant to have trends focused on New England and specifically the 
Commonwealth. In addition it is highly relevant to have a local forecast of housing supply and 
demand so that actions by the BBRS use local forecasts instead of national trends.  Analysis of 
fire data from MFIRS shows similar conclusions to analysis of fire data from NFIRS. In addition 
the analyses of NFIRS data by FEMA were used simply because the reports are shorter and more 
concise than reports issued by other entities. In addition, NFIRS or MFIRS fire data are limited 
in scope so when more information is garnered for each fire incident and analyzed, as was done 
by the One- and Two-Family Fire Sprinkler Committee, other conclusions result.   
If using local or national data as described above has produced a conclusion which is not well 
substantiated then appropriate statistical evidence is requested by the BBRS to either refute or 
reinforce the conclusion because a more accurate paper will be the result.  
Conclusion 1:  
There is a pressing need for more housing in the Commonwealth, especially more densely placed 
affordable housing in its various urban regions. The BBRS has a role in addressing this issue 
because it regulates building requirements for both new and existing buildings. If building 
requirements are many or unclear then the price of a new or existing building will be higher than 
if the requirements are fewer and clear.  
Conclusion 2:  
This conclusion is a corollary to conclusion 1. There is a need for building and fire officials to be 
trained on the use of the International Existing Building Code 2009 (IEBC) and its MA 
amendments and the 2014 BBRS Official Interpretation of the Existing Building Code. Section 3c 
outlines impediments to development and low cost construction including unclear, conflicting, or 
duplicative construction requirements. The IEBC is interpreted differently1, and therefore 
enforced differently, across the Commonwealth.  
Conclusion 3:  
This conclusion parallels conclusion 2 with training to private, municipal, and state building 
owners, developers, builders, engineers and architects. 
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Conclusion 4:  
This conclusion is a corollary to conclusion 1. There exists a potential to build lower cost multi-
unit residential buildings in the Commonwealth with enhanced or equivalent overall building 
occupancy life safety performance2 relative to those built to current code requirements.  
Recommendation 1: 
The BBRS should direct its Department of Public Safety (DPS) staff to provide the materials and 
the training to constituent bodies as described in Conclusions 2 and 3.  
Recommendation 2: 
The BBRS should direct its DPS staff, with technical expert assistance as required, to create a 
code proposal for new construction R-2 buildings up to 6 units, which addresses Conclusions 1 
and 4 and the issues outlined in this paper. This code proposal should incorporate 
Recommendation 3.   
Recommendation 3: 
Because of the recent changes in the Energy Conservation requirements in the code and feedback 
from the regulated community on cost of these requirements for low rise residential multi-unit 
buildings the BBRS should direct its DPS staff to author a White Paper on Cost and 
Effectiveness for Health, Safety, and Security of Energy Conservation Systems in Multi-Unit 
Residential Buildings and incorporate the conclusions of it into the code proposal in 
Recommendation 2.  
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Notes to Section 1  
1. Additionally the General Objectives of the BBRS pertaining to the cost of construction 
are found in M.G.L. c. 143, §95 (b) & (c)  
2. Discussions with several building departments, including those in Brockton, 
Northampton, and Holyoke revealed anecdotal evidence of this.  For example, some 
Brockton owners are converting 3 unit buildings to 2 family dwellings while some 
Northampton owners are doing the same thing or allowing buildings to sit vacant.   
Notes to Section 2 
1. The dates shown should be considered approximations. For precise dates please check 
with the Secretary of State . 
2. The Model 15 effort was approved at the September 2011 meeting and is copied here in 
part:   
BBRS requests that the Energy Advisory Committee (EAC), the Structural 
Advisory Committee (SAC), the Geotechnical Advisory Committee (GAC), the 
Fire Prevention and Fire Protection Advisory Committee (FPFP), and the Chapter 
34 Advisory Committee (34AC) to evaluate each current Massachusetts 
amendment to the model codes against the following questions: 
1. Does the amendment reduce or show equivalency to construction costs 
relative to the 2009 ICC code?  (Y or N) 
2. Does the amendment address the specific intent of MA General Law? (Y 
or N) 
3. Does the amendment address a unique Massachusetts condition that 
warrants it? (Y or N) 
The initial selection filter is as follows: 
• If the answer is ‘yes’ to any of these questions the amendment may 
remain. If the amendment that remains adds cost then the committee will 
provide the cost increase analysis.  
• If the answer is ‘no’ to all three questions then the amendment may be 
deleted. However, if the BBRS is presented with valid life safety 
statistics that justify the increased initial construction costs and/or 
increased life cycle costs then the amendment shall remain.  
• If the amendment deletes an I-Code requirement then the committee 
shall identify the unique criteria as to why it is deleted. 
3. Not included in this list are accessibility requirements which are governed by the 
Architectural Access Board and enforced by building officials. Since 1996 the 
Commonwealth has been a national leader via 521 CMR in providing access to its 
citizens with disabilities.  
4. Overarching the code are requirements in Massachusetts General Law for sprinklers in 
buildings. M.G.L. c.148 §26G  has been in effect statewide since January 1, 2010 , and 
requires sprinklers in new commercial buildings over 7500 sq. ft. as well as existing 
buildings undergoing significant renovations. It should be noted that this law does not 
allow the building to be separated with fire rated walls or ceilings. M.G.L. c.148, §26G 
came on the heels of a tragic fire in Newton where 5 lives were lost. MA State 
Representative Ruth Balser who has the city of Newton in her district was an 
instrumental figure in the passage of this legislative act. Her views on sprinklers can be 
seen at this NFPA Sprinkler Blog.  
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Notes to Section 3  
1. This paper reviews and analyzes ‘raw’ data for the various topics addressed; a simpler 
path could have been to reference reports or papers or conclusions issued by Realtor 
groups, the National Fire Protection Association, the National Association of Home 
Builders, or other entities. However, business entities whether for profit and not for profit 
may have a bias on the subject matter within their scope. Feedback which examines data 
in an industry accepted manner on any topic in this paper is anticipated and welcome, as 
it will make this paper a more accurate and valuable document.     
2. Many sources can be accessed for these data including the US Census. At this particular 
site http://www.russellsage.org/research/chartbook/social-inequality one can view income 
data from multiple perspectives and trends over time, and across gender and race. For this 
paper median values are used in order to be consistent with the median home price and 
home value data. 
3. US Census data on home values from 1940 to 2000 in adjusted and unadjusted dollars 
can be found at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html. 
Ellen Wilson at the US Census Bureau indicated in a phone conversation on January 2, 
2014 that the home value data is supplied by the US Census respondents on their census 
form, in response to what the value of the home would be on the local housing market. 
When asked: “Do these home values accurately reflect market home price?” Ellen 
indicated that they do. A comparison (see below) of sale price of homes in MA from 
1970 to 2000 with US Census home values corroborates this opinion. 
 
 
4. John Dulczewski., the executive director of the Greater Boston Association of 
REALTORS has supplied Massachusetts home sale data which span the time frame 2005 
to 2012 along with discrete data points of average home sale prices dating back to the 
1940’s.   
5. American Community Survey by the US Census Bureau can be found at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/  
6. Home affordability tools are numerous. The one used for this study is found here: 
http://www.hsh.com/calc-howmuch.html   
7. As defined by the US Census Bureau… “the median household income includes the 
income of the householder and all other individuals 15 years old and over in the 
household, whether they are related to the householder or not. Because many households 
consist of only one person, average household income is usually less than average family 
income. The median divides the income distribution into two equal parts: one-half of the 
cases falling below the median income and one-half above the median. For households 
and families, the median income is based on the distribution of the total number of 
households and families including those with no income. The median income for 
individuals is based on individuals 15 years old and over with income. Median income 
MA Median Home Value MA Average
Year US Census Sale Price
2000 185,700 261,293
1990 162,800 181,225
1980 48,400 59,269
1970 20,600 25,125
MA Median Sale PriceMA Average Sale Price Single Family
Single Family  Single Family  Factor 
Jan-04 323,000 394,876 1.223
MA Median Sale PriceMA Average Sale Price Condo
Condo Condo  Factor 
Jan-04 245,000 279,175 1.139
using Single Family Factor
MA Median Value to Average Value MA Median Value to Average Value
using Condo Factor
227,023
199,027
211,603
Equivalence Factor to Convert Median to Average
185,509
59,170
25,184
55,151
23,473
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for households, families, and individuals is computed on the basis of a standard 
distribution.” 
8. Rate of home ownership data were pulled from 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html   
9. For example the State House News recently issued this: 
REPORT: HOUSING BOOM NEEDED TO FUEL STATE’S ECONOMY 
 
By Michael Norton 
STATE HOUSE NEWS SERVICE 
 
STATE HOUSE, BOSTON, JAN. 16, 2014…Massachusetts must significantly boost its housing supply to 
attract the younger workers needed to increase its labor force and help drive economic growth in the next 
decades, according to a new report. 
 
The Metropolitan Area Planning Council report found the metro Boston area will need 435,000 new housing 
units by 2040 to attract younger workers while also accommodating the state’s growing senior population. 
The report suggests the new units would mostly be situated in multi-family settings and in urban areas.  
 
Under a slow-growth scenario the region’s population would grow 6.6 percent over three decades, with its 65 
and older population increasing 82 percent and its working-age population essentially unchanged. Without an 
influx of younger workers, jobs in the region could grow by less than 1 percent from 2010 to 2040, the report 
said. 
 
The report’s “stronger region” growth scenario envisions a population increase of 12.6 percent, with the 
population between 25 and 64 years old increasing 7 percent and adding 175,000 new workers to the labor 
force.  
 
The report says 435,000 new housing units would be needed from 2010 to 2040 under the “stronger region” 
scenario and 305,000 under the slow-growth, “status quo” scenario, which would still represent a 17 percent 
increase. The demand exists for new housing, including apartments and condominiums, even though a 
“senior sell-off” may provide most of the single-family homes needed by younger families. 
 
“Which scenario is more likely to occur depends on decisions yet to be made,” the report said. “Individual 
households will make their own choices about where to live, but they will do so in a context influenced by 
public sector actions and investments. Policies to promote housing construction will facilitate the higher in-
migration rates that characterize the Stronger Region scenario. Conversely, continued widespread opposition 
to new housing will likely result in less.” 
 
In the report, the council says it favor the “stronger region” approach for municipalities and says that 
approach is already the basis behind the state Executive Office of Housing and Economic Development’s 
multi-family housing production goals. 
 
“More than a million of the region’s workers will be retired by the year 2030,” Marc Draisen, the council’s 
executive director, said in a statement. “To fill those jobs and grow the economy we need to reverse the 
trends that see so many young workers leaving Metro Boston.” 
 
The report, which includes projections by municipality, says the number of school-age children in the region 
peaked in 2000 and is likely to decline in the coming decades. It warns that without an effort to increase 
housing production, one of the state’s biggest assets - a skilled and educated workforce - is in jeopardy. 
 
END 
01/16/2014   
The full report is found here: http://www.mapc.org/data-services/available-
data/projections. The Metropolitan Area Planning Council has statutory authority via 
M.G.L. c. 40B, §24   
10. A November 2013 report issued Barry Bluestone, Director of the Dukakis Center for 
Urban & Regional Policy, is another source on this subject. It has a lot of data in chart 
form but is relatively easy to understand and follow. The report is found here: 
http://www.gbreb.com/uploadedFiles/GBAR/GBAR_Education_and_Events/BBLUEST
ONEPRES2014.pdf?n=5679  Particular attention should be paid to pages 30 and 31.   
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Notes to Section 4 
1. There are numerous videos provided by sprinkler companies which demonstrate how 
various components of the system operate. For an example of sprinkler head operation 
see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=arKMrY-3RIg . 
2. Most sprinkler heads are equipped with a glass cylinder filled with a glycerin-based 
liquid that expands at the appropriate temperature, breaking the glass and activating the 
sprinkler head. The sprinkler head is attached to a system of pipes that are hidden behind 
the walls or ceiling. These pipes wind through the building and to connect with a reliable 
water source. When the sprinkler head is triggered water under pressure in the piping 
system is released through the head.  
3. From page 8 of the report:  
At the apparent “low end’ of costs – this information is obtained from an NFPA research 
paper, “Home Fire Sprinklers Cost Assessment”, issued in September of 2008 – a 
particular community in MA (North Andover), has been able to incorporate residential 
sprinkler systems, with CPVC piping for “stand-alone” systems for a cost ranging from 
$1.10 per sprinklered square foot to $1.36 per sq. ft. of living space as the cost to the 
builder.  
Assumptions:  
1. Water purveyor costs are zero. 
2. Cost markup (to sell price) is not included 
 
From page 8 of the report: 
The Home builders note that the above costs are installation costs and do not reflect the 
cost to the end user or homeowner. Based on an HBAM survey of it members installing 
NFPA 13D sprinkler systems, the average cost to the homebuyer in MA was $13,574.59 
per home or $4.02* per sq. ft.  
Assumptions:  
1. Water purveyor costs are included 
2. Cost markup (sell price) is included 
 
If the low end cost is increased by a 10% mark-up to estimate a sell price, and ignoring 
costs that may be incurred by water purveyors, the range of cost to the homeowner is 
$1.50 to $4.02 per sq ft of living space.  For a home with 2,200 sq ft of living space and 
an unfinished basement, the price increase for a 13D sprinkler system is in the range of 
$4950 to $13,266. Please note that variables outlined in the OTFRC report may further 
increase the prices shown in the paragraph above. The OTFRC also noted periodic 
maintenance and tests and associated costs, which may be required in some 
circumstances.  
*The $4.02 is considered an average per sq. ft. cost based on the data in the 
HBAM Survey which indicated a range of  costs from $2.37 to $6.23 per sq. ft. 
Critics of the HBAM Survey argue that at least some of the costs reported are 
related to the cost of NFPA 13R systems vs. NFPA 13D systems.  In response to 
these criticisms, HBAM notes that the costs reported in the HBAM Survey 
represent actual experience of their constituents attempting to satisfy local 
requirements in specific communities.  
4.  BBRS meeting minutes can be found here: BBRS Agenda and Meeting Minutes  
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Notes to Section 5 
1. Information reported on death certificates, which is completed by funeral directors, 
attending physicians, medical examiners, and coroners, is presented in descriptive 
tabulations. The original records are filed in state registration offices. Statistical 
information is compiled in a national database through the Vital Statistics Cooperative 
Program of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Center for Health 
Statistics. Causes of death are processed in accordance with the International 
Classification of Diseases,  Tenth Revision  
2. See for example paper No. 500 by Donna Glassbrenner of the National Center for 
Statistics and Analysis at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Estimating 
the Lives Saved by Safety Belts and Air Bags 
3. The RMW in MA since October 28, 2005 has a MA DOT Ignition Interlock Devices 
program as a result of Melanie’s Law.  
4. USA fatalities due to OUI dropped significantly between 1990 and 2001 due to 
campaigns associated with OUI awareness and laws like Zero Tolerance. However since 
2001 there is little change. Although the number of deaths associated with OUI has 
dropped for the time period of 2001 to 2010 the trend of Fatalities Involving Alcohol as a 
Percentage of Total Fatalities is flat as indicated in Table 1 here:  
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/by_the_numbers/drunk
_driving/index.html  
5. BBRS member Jerry Ludwig provided these comments on the EPA mortality estimate: 
“Exposure to radon gas and its decay products (commonly referred to as daughters) 
has long been known as a health risk.  Epidemiological studies performed as far back as 
40 years ago showed increase risk of lung cancer in underground miners.  Corrected for 
smoking they have a higher risk of lung cancer compared to the general population.  
Almost all of the subjects were working age men.  Their exposure was an occupational 
exposure.  
The risk assessment performed by the World Health Organization (WHO), EPA, 
National Research Council Committee on Health Risks of Exposure to Radon (BEIR VI), 
etc.,  and offered as exposure guidelines is based on an extrapolation of exposure data 
approximately 2 orders of magnitude lower than the exposure of the miner group. The 
miner group is only comprised of adults, and only men (i.e., no women and no children). 
The studies did not account for exposure to diesel, a known lung carcinogen. 
Extrapolation is done all of the time, but it is not necessarily as reliable as other data 
analysis means.  As engineers, architects, etc., we are all probably familiar with 
interpolation, in which we fill-in data points between two data points published in a chart 
of measured or modeled values.  Extrapolation is a totally different technique that in the 
lack of sufficient data may be justified, it is much less reliable, and when additional data 
is available it should not be employed.  Extrapolation draws a line from areas of known 
data and projects the trend into areas where data is not available. 
The lung cancer estimates from BEIR VI and EPA have large uncertainty estimates. 
For example, EPA estimates 21,000 deaths with a 90% confidence interval of 8,000 to 
45,000. BEIR VI has a 95% confidence limit that ranges from 3,300 to 32,600. 
Extrapolation is often done in the health sciences, and is not necessarily a bad thing.  
Experiments done on rats are used to test treatments intended for humans, etc., all of 
which are commonly accepted, and certainly better than no test at all.  My point is that 
extrapolation is not as reliable as interpolation, and in some instances can lead to bad 
results. 
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Based on radon maps of the US, there are hot spots for radon that would lead one to 
expect increased lung cancer mortality (i.e., lung cancer clusters) in certain sections of 
Pennsylvania, Iowa, New Hampshire, etc.  Most of the epidemiological studies that have 
attempted to find an association between radon and lung cancer in the general population 
have produced null findings (i.e., no evidence of an association), despite the findings 
from the occupational studies of miners. BEIR VI and EPA have chosen to use the miner 
studies as the basis for assessing risk.” 
Notes to Section 6 
1. One example is NFPA’s 2013 report on Home Structure Fires by Marty Ahrens which 
contains this abstract: 
“NFPA estimates that U.S. fire departments responded to an average of 366,600 home 
structure fires per year during the five-year-period of 2007-2011. These fires caused an 
estimated average of 2,570 civilian deaths, 13,210 civilian injuries, and $7.2 billion in 
direct property damage per year. Almost three-quarters (71%) of the reported home 
structure fires and 84% of the home fire deaths occurred in one- or two-family homes, 
including manufactured homes. The remainder occurred in apartments or other multi-
family housing. Cooking equipment is the leading cause of home structure fires and non-
fatal home fire injuries. Smoking materials are still the leading cause of home fire deaths. 
Half of all home fire deaths result from incidents reported between 11:00 p.m. and 7:00 
a.m. One-quarter (25%) of all home fire deaths were caused by fires that started in the 
bedroom; another quarter (24%) resulted from fires originating in the living room, 
family room, or den; and 16% were caused by fires starting in the kitchen. Three out of 
five home fire deaths resulted from fires in which no smoke alarms were present or in 
which smoke alarms were present but did not operate. Compared to other age groups, 
older adults were more likely to be killed by a home fire. These estimates are based on 
data from the U.S. Fire Administration’s (USFA’s) National Fire Incident Reporting 
System (NFIRS) and the National Fire Protection Association’s (NFPA’s) annual fire 
department experience survey.” 
2. See http://www.usfa.fema.gov/statistics/reports/residential_structures.shtm for a list of 
reports. Each report and contains on the opening page this message to the reader: “These 
topical reports are designed to explore facets of the U.S. fire problem as depicted 
through data collected in the U.S. Fire Administration’s National Fire Incident Reporting 
System. Each topical report briefly addresses the nature of the specific fire or fire-related 
topic, highlights important findings from the data, and may suggest other resources to 
consider for further information. Also included are recent examples of fire incidents that 
demonstrate some of the issues addressed in the report or that put the report topic in 
context.” 
3. The 2007 to 2009 report showed similar findings to the 2009 to 2011 report thus only 
data from the 2009 to 2011 report is presented herein. 
4. “As a result of the type of building, the more stringent building and code requirements, 
and the fact that more people live in the building itself than in the predominant one- and 
two-family residences, fires in multifamily residential buildings tend to have a different 
profile than fires in other types of residences. A major difference in the multifamily 
residential building fire profile is seen in cooking fires. Cooking was the cause of 70 
percent of multifamily residential building fires, twice that of other residential buildings. 
Multifamily residential buildings also tend to have central heating systems that are 
maintained by professionals instead of homeowners, thus there are fewer heating fires 
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from poor maintenance or misuse than in one- and two-family dwellings. Also, fire 
problems related to fireplaces, chimneys and fireplace- related equipment tend to occur 
less often in multifamily heating fires since multifamily residential buildings generally 
lack these features. Finally, multifamily residential buildings usually have fewer fires 
caused by electrical problems due to construction materials, building codes and 
professional maintenance.” 
5. The section from this report is copied here:  
“III-1 Fire History and Statistics in Massachusetts  
Utilizing information acquired from the Massachusetts Fire Incident Reporting System (MFIRS) and a 
follow-on “BUILDINGS – FATAL FIRE SURVEY” issued by the One and Two Family Residential 
Sprinkler Committee (OTFRSC), the following is presented: 
EXCERPTED FROM A MASSACHUSETTS 1-& 2-FAMILY FATAL FIRES DFS SURVEY OF THE 
213 COMMUNITIES REPORTING FATAL FIRE EVENTS IN 1- & 2- FAMILY HOUSING (1986 – 
2005): 
Between 1986 – 2005 there were 561 fatal fires in 1- & 2- family residences in Massachusetts. The 
following information reflects only the fatal fire events. 
- 677 civilian fire deaths 
- 262 civilian injuries 
- 440 fire service injuries 
- $40.3 million in total damages (561 fires – see above) 
Between 2001 and 2005 there were 25,097 structure fires (including fatal fires) reported via MFIRS in 1 & 
2- Family homes 
- 130 civilian deaths 
- 144 civilian injuries 
- 1,118 fire service injuries 
- $339 million in total dollar loss (25,097 fires – see above) 
This Survey reveals that 20 fatal fires (for the timeframe 1986 – 2005) occurred in homes built after 1975 
(1975 is when the Massachusetts State Building Code came into effect for the first time). 
- 20 civilian fire deaths 
- 6 civilian injuries 
- 13 fire service injuries 
It is noted that relative to information presented above, extracted from the Massachusetts Fire Incidence 
Reporting System (MFIRS), MFIRS data is considered by some to report conservatively low. 
OTFRSC FOLLOW-ON SURVEY 
The OTFRSC voted to pursue a follow-on Survey to the DFS Survey in an effort to better understand the 
fire event, the nature of the victims, and if, for example, older electrical systems were problematic or if 
smoke detectors existed at all or if smoke detectors were functioning, etc., or simply to ascertain if older 
housing stock played any significant role in reported residential fires. 
A sample “BUILDINGS – FIRE FATALITIES SURVEY (1-6-09)” Survey Form with its family of 
questions asked can be found in Appendix C of this Report. 
Also included in Appendix C1 of this Report, please find a Spreadsheet of detailed Survey answers related 
to the responses below. 
213 cities and towns were queried in this follow-on Survey with 20 communities (some w/multiple fatal 
fire events) responding.  
No Survey response was sufficient to ascertain if older electrical systems or older housing construction 
were trending as problematic. 
In Summary, of the 40 fatal fires surveyed (refer to Appendix C2): 
- 7 homes had no smoke detectors. 
- 2 homes were reported as having smoke detectors that were not operating. 
- In 13 homes it was not known or reported if smoke detectors existed or were operating. 
- Hard wired, interconnected smoke detectors were reported in 3 homes. 
- Both ionization and photoelectric smoke detector types were identified in homes w/fatal fires. 
- Of 38 reported fatalities, 14 victims were reported intimate with the fire. 
- 16 of the fatalities were caused by improper use of smoking materials. 
- The majority of fire victims were adults ranging in age from 25 to 93 but four children of ages 
2, 2.5. 5 and 10 were victims in three of the reported fires with the 10 year old in a fatal fire 
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where smoke detectors were not present and the remaining 3 children in fatal fires where the 
status of smoke detectors was not reported. 
Based on the DFS Survey discussed above there were 20 fire related deaths between 1986 and 2005 in 
homes built since 1976 with hard wired smoke detectors. Of those 20 deaths, 4 victims were identified as 
intimate with the fire event (those victims intimate with the fire are often assumed lost) therefore the total 
number of deaths is viewed as 16. 
Of those 16 deaths there is no data on whether or not the smoke detectors were working.  If we assume 
20% of the smoke detectors were not working it brings the deaths down to 13 in a 20 year period for homes 
with working hard wired smoke detectors.  (See attached HBAM analysis in Appendix E).” 
6. MS Excel file ‘Residential Fatal Fires 2003 – 2012’ received from DFS on January 31, 
2014 at 12:30 p.m. contains nine column headings: Town, County, Address, Date, 
Incident #, Total Deaths, Occupancy, Cause, and Detector Code. A small number (6) of 
the fire incidents were in occupancies other than ‘apartments’. For this paper the data 
were all presented as ‘multi-unit residential buildings’ 
7. Many sources can be used to find these numbers. For this paper the source was used: 
http://www.city-data.com/crime/crime-Boston-Massachusetts.html#ixzz2sGup8F00  
 
Notes to Section 7 
1. At the BBRS meeting on April 8, 2014, and per the request of State Fire Marshal Stephen 
Coan’s designee on the BBRS, DPS Staff was directed to include a section on the 
effectiveness of fire protection systems in this paper. This topic and others (including for 
example Section 7b Property Loss) had previously been written in draft form by the 
author but not released for consideration by the BBRS. As a result of this BBRS request, 
the original draft of this section was revisited and rewritten to some extent to produce 
Section 7a contained herein.  
2. For examples see http://www.usfa.fema.gov/statistics/reports/residential_structures.shtm 
for a list of reports. 
3. Letter dated April 4, 2014, Re: Response to “Draft White Paper on “The Cost and 
Effectiveness for Health, Safety, and Security of Fire Alarm Systems and Fire Sprinkler 
Systems in 3 to 6 Unit Residential Buildings”  
4. See "US Experience with Sprinklers" authored in June 2013 by John R. Hall, Jr. of the 
Fire Analysis and Research Division of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). 
Note that Shannon references US fires in the years 2006 to 2010. The information 
contained in this paper was pulled from Hall’s report on US fires in the years 2007 to 
2011.  
5. For example Table 4-1 of this report has a note that in part reads… “Figures exclude fires 
with sprinkler status unknown or unreported, partial sprinkler systems not in fire area, 
and structures under construction; and reflect recodings explained in Introduction: Fires 
are excluded if the reason for failure or ineffectiveness is system not present in area of 
fire. Fires are recoded from operated but ineffective to failed if the reason for failure or 
ineffectiveness was system shut off. Fires are recoded from failed to operated but 
ineffective if the reason for failure or ineffectiveness was not enough agent or agent did 
not reach fire. In Version 5.0 of NFIRS, if multiple systems are present, the system coded 
is supposed to be the one system designed to protect the hazard where the fire started. 
This field is not required if the fire did not begin within the designed range of the 
system.” 
6. John Hall provides an overview of this topic on pages 31 and 32 in his report (see Note 4 
above for link to his report).  
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7. See for example: http://www.haifire.com/services/forensic-engineering-litigation-
support/sprinkler-system-corrosion/  
8. For example in M.G.L. c. 148, §26G  is written...”For purposes of this section, the gross 
square footage of a building or structure shall include the sum total of the combined floor 
areas for all floor levels, basements, sub-basements and additions, in the aggregate, 
measured from the outside walls, irrespective of the existence of interior fire resistive 
walls, floors and ceilings” and in Chapter 9 of the building code this national code 
definition: 
FIRE AREA. The aggregate floor area enclosed and bounded by fire walls, fire barriers, 
exterior walls or horizontal assemblies of a building. Areas of the building not provided 
with surrounding walls shall be included in the fire area if such areas are included within  
the horizontal projection of the roof or floor next above. 
  
 is replaced with this MA requirement: 
FIRE AREA. The aggregate area of a building regardless of subdivisions by fire barriers 
and horizontal assemblies.  
Notes to Section 8 
1. While assembling data for a December 2013 benchmark study of sprinkler installations in 
seven cities in the Commonwealth it was evident that the sprinkler ‘trigger’, commonly 
known as substantial alteration, used in the previous edition of the building code was 
still being used in practice in 3 of the 7 cities. This ‘trigger’ is based on cost while the 
current edition of the building code using the IEBC typically triggers sprinkler 
requirement based on the work area involved in the project. The two methods may or 
may not produce the same end result, but this clearly demonstrates the need for training 
to produce a single, consistent, state-wide building code.   
2.  
a. Currently there is no radon mitigation requirement for R-2 buildings even though 
relatively low cost piping as the conduit for this gas could be installed at time of 
construction. If high concentrations are found then a relatively low cost fix can be 
implemented. If all of this is done after construction is complete the costs increase by a 
factor of 4.  
b.Although falls has not been a specific safety topic addressed by the BBRS the mortality 
numbers suggest that areas beyond those typically associated with this risk (movement 
in stairways, exits, porches, etc.) should be considered.  
c. A fire may occur at some point in the life of a residential building, and thus a fire 
protection system is a necessary life safety system. However, the BBRS may explore 
effective ways via code regulation which reduce the cause or occurrence of fires and 
thereby produce enhanced or equivalent fire safety performance of residential buildings 
relative to buildings constructed to the current code.  
